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ABSTRACT
While Wittgenstein is not famous for his writings on religion, it is 
certainly possible to interpret his work in such a way that it can be 
applied to religion. As Wittgenstein's work is generally divided in 
early and late work, this paper provides two interpretation 
regarding religion. His early work – Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus – can be considered a form of  negative theology. 
His later work – Philosophical Investigations – offers an 
anthropologic method, i.e. the language game, that can be applied 
to religion.
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udwig Wittgenstein (Vienna, Austria 26 April 1889 – Cambridge, LUnited Kingdom 29 April 1951) is a well-known philosopher for his 
work on logics, philosophy of  mathematics, the mind and language. He has 
influenced contemporary philosophy – analytical philosophy, pragmatism as 
well as postmodernism – and also the social sciences. Many consider him an 
idiosyncratic genius, as for example Bertrand Russell. Russell wrote the 
introduction to the only book that was published during Wittgenstein's life: 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Actually, Wittgenstein disagreed with Russell's 
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interpretation, but this was the only way to get the book published; due to its 
complicated subject matter many publishers refused the manuscript. 
Wittgenstein started writing notes for this book during World War I, when he 
was a volunteer soldier for the Austro-Hungarian army (he received several 
medals for showing courage at the eastern front). Wittgenstein's notebooks 
and Philosophical Investigations were published posthumously.
Wittgenstein always had a love-hate relationship with academic 
philosophy; he told his students to quite philosophy if  they did not have 
anything original to say; philosophy should be useful and should not be 
conducted just for its own sake. Wittgenstein left the academic world for 
periods of  time to work as a primary school teacher, a gardener at a 
monastery, an architect for the house of  his sister and in a hospital during 
World War II.
Wittgenstein was born in a well-to-do family, his family converted to 
Protestantism from Judaism (the Nazi regime still considered Wittgenstein's 
family Jewish though). This essay, however, is not a biography or historical 
account of  how Wittgenstein lived religion in his day-to-day life. 
Wittgenstein wrote, on the other hand, only from time-to-time explicitly on 
religion, which will be the topic of  the following section. The following two 
sections give interpretations of  Wittgenstein's work in the light of  religion. 
The Tracatus is discussed in the second section and the Philosophical 
Investigations in the third section. While generally these two books are 
considered two separate periods in Wittgenstein's thinking, I use them to 
approach religion from two different directions; on religion there is 
considerable continuity between these two periods. In the Tractatus, he treats 
metaphysics in general and religion in particular from the perspective of  
logics. This book claims how we should use language to make sense from a 
logical perspective. In this early work he claims that logics has nothing to say 
about meaning, that amounts to nonsense in its logical implication; meaning, 
on the other hand, can be shown through forms, which we can call aesthetic 
ethics/ethical aesthetics. In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein uses 
an anthropological approach to discuss how we actually use language. And 
we do not only use language to make logical propositions. He speaks then of  
language-games, and religion can be interpreted as a language-game 
(Wittgenstein takes religion seriously, we should therefore not take the word 
'game' to mean that religion is merely a game). Wittgenstein uses the concept 
of  the language-game to signify that meaning is not in our mind or in the 
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things themselves but in our use of  language. We can use the same word in 
different contexts and the use in that context gives the word its meaning. We 
can treat religion as a language-game, because throughout human history we 
try to find ways to make explicit the profound implicit and to express the 
unspeakable.
Wittgenstein on Religion
If  religion is defined as an institutionalized belief  system, then 
Wittgenstein cannot be considered religious, because neither was he 
interested in theological doctrines and dogmas, nor in participating in 
religious activities. He was, however, interested in mystical questions. And he 
realized that logic does not suffice to provide answers.
One of  Wittgenstein's influences was the Russian novelist Count Leo 
Tolstoy. During World War I, Wittgenstein discovered the book The Gospel in 
Brief  by Tolstoy. In this book Tolstoy writes:
“I was looking for an answer to the question of  life and not to 
theological or historical questions, and so for me the chief  
question was not whether Jesus was or was not God, or from 
whom the Holy Ghost proceeded and so forth, and equally 
unimportant and unnecessary was it for me to know when and by 
whom each Gospel was written and whether such and such a 
parable may, or may not, be ascribed to Christ. What was 
important to me was this light which has enlightened mankind 
for eighteen hundred years and which enlightened and still 
enlightens me; but how to name the source of  that light, and 
what materials he or someone else had kindled, did not concern 
2
me.”
This was an eye-opener for Wittgenstein. The Tractatus deals with similar 
questions (questions Russell overlooked in his introduction); for the writer 
of  the Tractatus naming the source of  this spirited light amounts to logical 
nonsense, which is discussed in more detail in the next section. Tolstoy writes 
that he is not concerned how to name the source of  that light, however, it 
comes under many different names: love, benevolence, justice, truth and, of  
course, God, the topic of  the third section.
Søren Kierkegaard's work was another inspiration source for 
3
Wittgenstein.  “Wisdom,” Wittgenstein notes, “is passionless. But faith by 
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contrast is what Kierkegaard calls a passion.”  Unlike science, faith is colorful,  
6
and this colorfulness sets us to contemplate.  We should wonder about the 
miracle that there is existence in the first place, this wonder is overlooked by 
science, because it only looks at what exists, and scientific explanations put us 
asleep, because science in general and logic in particular cannot go beyond 
7
the existing facts.  
Passion cannot be acquired by mere instruction; one has to belief  
sincerely by showing the intention to live by it. Therefore, philosophy and life 
should be connected, i.e. if  one wants to remain integrity one has apply one's 
8
thoughts into one's life.  Today, analytical philosophers who study 
Wittgenstein's work overlook this; philosophy is then merely another form 
of  science. Philosophy ought to have practical implications, according to 
Wittgenstein, and he, therefore, criticizes Socrates (and Plato): “Reading the 
Socratic dialogues one has the feeling: what a frightful waste of  time! What's 
the point of  these arguments that prove nothing and clarify nothing?” And: 
“Socrates keeps reducing the sophist to silence, – but does he have right on his 
side when he does this? Well, it is true that the sophist does not know what he 
thinks he knows; but that is no triumph for Socrates. It can't be a case of  'You 
see! You don't know it!' – nor yet, triumphantly, of  'So none of  us knows 
9
anything!'”
Wittgenstein was a perfectionist and he, despite being considered a 
genius by others, acknowledged his moral imperfection and the 
improbability of  attaining perfection: 
“I never more than half  succeed in expressing what I want to 
express. Actually not as much as that, but by no more than a 
tenth. That is still worth something. Often my writing is nothing 
but 'stuttering'. […] A writer far more talented than I would still 
10
have only a minor talent.”
Both Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein saw it as their moral duty to live life to 
the fullest, and to fulfill this demanding task – this heavy burden – it does not 
suffice to lower the bar. And for both authors there is a connection between 
the ethical and the aesthetic – we need forms to express our deepest passion: 
faith – and between philosophy and aesthetics – we need forms to express 
11
our thoughts.
The connection between ethics and aesthetics is further discussed in the 
next section, but this connection is also discussed in a public lecture 
Wittgenstein delivered: “A Lecture on Ethics.” In this lecture Wittgenstein 
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claims that aesthetics is essentially connected to ethics, which he defines as 
the enquiry into the good in the widest sense. Wittgenstein claims then that 
“instead of  saying 'Ethics is the enquiry into what is good' I could have said 
Ethics is the enquiry into what is valuable, or, into what is really important, or 
I could have said Ethics is the enquiry into the meaning of  life, or into what 
12
makes life worth living, or into the right way of  living.”
Wittgenstein recognizes that there are two forms of  the good: the relative 
and the absolute good. Something is a relative good in relation to a 
predetermined end, i.e. a relative good is a mean. For example, a road is good 
if  it leads me to my chosen destination; this can also be called instrumental 
rationality: if  we have set a certain end we can calculate the best means to 
arrive at this end, moreover, this means that I do not have to accept a certain 
mean if  I also do not share the end. An absolute good is entirely different: I 
ought to value it and I ought to act accordingly. Wittgenstein claims then that 
“although all judgments of  relative value can be shown to be mere 
statements of  facts, no statement of  fact can ever be, or imply, a judgment of  
absolute value [compare David Hume: we cannot derive an ought from what is 
13
the case].”  Therefore, no factual proposition can express the sublime. The 
ultimate important cannot be expressed through words. However, if  we can 
live a life with faith instead of  despair then we will experience the world in an 
entirely different way, i.e. with hope, the hope that we are not ultimately 
14
alone. Faith, however, is no easy matter.
That faith is no easy matter also comes to the fore in “Lectures on 
Religious Belief.” Wittgenstein says: “A belief  isn't like a momentary state of  
15
mind.”  Faith is, he claims, unshakeable, i.e. it cannot be falsified. Moreover, 
it does not appeal to falsifiable reasons, i.e. it cannot be proven false. The 
word 'believe' is here not used in its normal connotation, e.g. 'I believe that it 
will rain this afternoon' is a different statement from 'I believe in God'. The 
same goes for 'to know', e.g. 'I know that he lives in Bandung' is different 
from 'I know that God resides in the heavens above'. Faith does not use 
hypotheses of  which we can test the validity and probability. Even when 
religions make use of  a historical narrative, such a narrative is different from 
how historians look at history. Faith is not an opinion, nor does faith apply 
doubt as in science, therefore, Wittgenstein claims, dogma can be considered 
16
a synonym of  faith.  However, from the fact that scientific methods cannot 
be applied to faith, we cannot conclude that faith is merely a fairy tale – faith 
and science are different language games, as discussed in the third section.
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The sublime is then the mystical wonder at existence, even though we 
cannot imagine that the world could not have existed. Wittgenstein sums his 
17
ethics up by claiming that “[w]hat is good is also divine.”  And since the 
divine is outside the space of  facts, religion runs 
“Against the boundaries of  language. This running against the 
walls of  our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as 
it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate 
meaning of  life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be 
no science. […] But it is a document of  a tendency in the human 
mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I 
18
would not for my life ridicule it.”  
That what cannot be expressed through logical propositions can be 
shown is discussed in the next section. In the third section it is discussed that 
we actually do try to express the absolute valuable by running 'against the 
walls of  our cage' and by trying to transcend this worldly 'cage' (a clear 
reference to Plato's allegory) by forming religions.
Religion as Aesthetic Ethics/Ethical Aesthetics
That we are unable to make the divine explicit through our language can 
be considered a form of  negative theology. “In consequence,” Stephen D. 
Moore writes, “negative theology can be said to be a self-subverting 
discourse that systematically showcases its own inadequacy to the theological 
task of  enclosing God in concepts – a stuttering disruption of  the confident 
19
assertions of  conventional theological discourse.”  The infinite is thus 
absence. However, we can shape our being and actions in aesthetic forms to 
show a moral – and religious – outlook on our being and acting in the world.
“What can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about 
20
we must pass over in silence.”  That does not mean, though, that what 
cannot be said has no meaning, that what cannot be said can be shown. For 
Ludwig Wittgenstein silence has profound meaning.
21
Philosophy shows “that meaning is a practical affair.”  Ethics is not a 
theoretical discipline: we do not ask what the good for human beings is 
simply because we want to acquire knowledge, but because doing so we will 
be better able to live well. We have to give meaning to things. Things are mere 
things and we give them meaning through a continuous process of  (re-
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)interpretation and (re-)valuation. The practical affair of  giving meaning is 
therefore not only a human, all too human thing to do – to speak with 
Friedrich Nietzsche – it is something that is done extrinsically. Values do not 
exist intrinsically, there are no essences to discover, and this is thus an anti-
essentialist perspective.
Philosophers like Nietzsche and Wittgenstein criticize the eternal 
Platonic Ideas. Even if  essences do exist, we have no means to make sense of  
them. They claim we have to see our ignorance as a virtue. They claim that we 
need to realize that there exists a void from where we can start creating values 
as if  our own life is to become an art piece. This is a quest against nihilism.
We should not forget, on the other hand, that creating values is not a 
22
solitary affair, even Nietzsche refutes this.  It is thus impossible to give 
meaning in solitude, we value within a web of  relationships, i.e. we cannot 
create ex nihilo (that is God's privilege). It is also impossible to create values 
that have only meaning to the creator (Wittgenstein calls this the 
impossibility of  a 'private language').
23
For Wittgenstein “philosophy is a 'critique of  language' […].”  In the 
Tracatatus, Wittgenstein tries to draw the boundaries of  language, and he 
claims “that ethics cannot be expressed. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and 
24
aesthetics are one.)”  That means that the absolute good can only be shown 
by styling ourselves in a certain way, therefore we have to consider ethics and 
25
aesthetics as a union: aesthetic ethics and ethical aesthetics.  It is through 
aesthetic self-styling that we show ourselves ethically.
Ethical values cannot be put in words or expressed through them, these 
values can only be aesthetically shown through styling our actions. According 
to Wittgenstein, values do not represent reality; values are not about the truth 
(as understood in logics). The ethical and aesthetic are about “'how' we 
26
express something rather than of  'what' we say (about it).”
We show our own life not in an abstract, rational language, but through a 
form or style. Kathrin Stengel comments on Wittgenstein:
“Style also reveals a person's perspective on the world. A person 
cannot but speak or write in 'his or her style' and in doing so 
reveal his or her attitude toward life and the world. The attitude 
thus manifested indicates an ethical perspective, as the meaning 
of  life is not something that we can create without using value 
judgments. Style, therefore, expresses ethical values in and 
through aesthetic form. More specifically, style offers a 
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perspective on the fundamental value of  all values: our own 
27
lives.”
Thus we understand the world ethically through an aesthetic form.
If  the 'I' is not a mere collection of  contingencies – random bones, 
organs, veins, skin tissue, experiences, sensations, desires, thoughts, et cetera 
– then the transcendental perspective is important. It is what Wittgenstein 
calls the perspective of  eternity. From this unique perspective, we can see our 
very own life as a work of  art. Through the perspective of  eternity we 
sublimate ourselves.
The world, according to Wittgenstein, is as it is: “everything is as it is, and 
28
happens as it does happen.”  The world as it is, does not contain meaning; we 
have to give it value. We make the contingent world a valuable place to live in. 
From the perspective of  eternity we give meaning to the present by seeing it 
caused for reasons. Stengel concludes: 
“While the ethical shows itself  only through aesthetic form, the 
aesthetic shows itself  only as an ethical perspective on life. This 
perspective, though it discloses an individual view, is already 
29
universal, for it necessarily implies a notion of  eternity […].”
Not so much what we say but how we style it, the form of  what we say is 
important. Therefore, Wittgenstein can claim that what he wrote is 
important, but equally important for him is what he did not write. David 
Rozema calls the Tractatus a poem: just as white lines have meaning in a poem 
so has passed over silence meaning. The content is expressed in a form, i.e. a 
30
form of  life: a life should be lived and not just be theorized.
In ethics and aesthetics we aspire for perfection, even though there are no 
given ideals:
“The ideal is expressed not by articulating it directly but by giving 
concrete examples, drawing comparisons or contrasts. Such 
examples may be other works in the history of  the same genre, or 
in another genre, or even invented for the purpose. […] Style, 
metaphor, analogy, the aspect of  things, the face of  concepts, 
examples – whether concrete or fictitious – become a part of  the 
31
toolbox of  the creative philosopher.”
The things in the world exist contingently, and therefore, according to 
Wittgenstein, without value, because values do not exist contingently. The 
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self  is the source of  ethical and aesthetic values.  Wittgenstein is not saying 
that empirical facts are irrelevant, but that their value cannot be explained by 
a reference to these facts. For Wittgenstein, philosophy is a criticism of  
language, and values cannot be expressed in or through propositional 
language, thus philosophy, as a negative conclusion, cannot say anything 
about meaning.
33
Ethics, for Wittgenstein, is what gives meaning to our world.  The self  
that values is not a part of  the empirical world, because that would make the 
self  an ordinary fact in the world, which has no moral value. The moral self  
can change the limits of  the world: “the world of  the happy man is a different 
34
one from that of  the unhappy man.”  The world requires a self  as a subject 
that is able to constitute a unity. “The metaphysical subject can give ethical 
35
meaning to life through the way in which it views the world as a whole.”  To 
create a structure in the world of  facts is an aesthetic activity: it is to see the 
world as a piece of  art to sublimate the contingent world.
Ethics for Wittgenstein starts from a non-logical necessity: to give 
meaning where there is no meaning. Ethics tries to go beyond the world of  
facts; it gives structure, so we can live a meaningful life in this contingent 
world. This structure is not a fact of  this world; we presuppose this structure 
on to the world. Ethics is thus transcendental, because it is not a part of  the 
world of  facts, but without this transcendental perspective there would only 
be arbitrary facts. That the world of  the happy man is different from the 
unhappy man indicates that there are a variety ethical perspectives, because 
there are many different ways to be happy and unhappy. And we do not have 
the scientific tools to decide which ethical perspective is the best, the truest.
To exemplify this we can look at the difference between the Old 
Testament (the Jewish holy book the Torah) and the New Testament. In the 
Old Testament we can read many categorical imperatives, for example the 
Ten Commandments. This contrasts with the New Testament. The only 
categorical imperative of  the New Testament is that we ought to love. The 
meaning of  love, however, is not defined in propositional language; it is, on 
the other hand, shown from different perspectives in fragmentary accounts 
of  the life of  Jesus. Jesus shows the meaning of  love in his interactions with 
significant others and this is shown in the Gospels.
Robert Hull writes that “Nietzsche reads the Gospels as if  they were a 
messy novel, written by multiple authors, whose central character is drawn 
36
sometimes convincely as, and sometimes the antitheses of, an euangelion.”  
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Jesus is thus the message as well as the messenger. Jesus' words and actions 
are signs for what cannot be expressed in ordinary – including theological – 
discourse. What we can emphasize in such a literary reading is not a doctrine 
or theory but a mode of  living an authentic life: Jesus practiced how we can 
live our life, and if  we do, heaven can be experienced in our own life. 
Just as the Cartesian mind-body dualism is nonsense, so is it impossible 
to separate style from content. We show meaning through styling it in a 
certain ways and not in other ways. Downgrading style to mere decoration, 
Susan Sontag writes in “Against Interpretation,” reduces 'reading' the 
content to an intellectual exercise, separating it from the body of  life, to make 
it safe, manageable. Reading should change our life and not leave us 
37
indifferent.  Love should not merely be understood intellectually, it should 
become part of  every fiber of  our body, so to speak, and only if  love is 
internalized we will act accordingly.
Aristotle gives in the Nicomachean Ethics another reason why such a 
reading of  the New Testament makes sense. He claims that there is no 
possibility of  writing a book of  rules, however long, that will serve as a 
complete guide to prudent decision-making. He, therefore, emphasizes 
phronesis, i.e. the prudence to interpret a situation to make a moral decision 
and to act upon that decision. I return to this in the next section.
Religion as a Language-Game
Charles Taylor asks the following important question: “What is the point 
38
of  articulacy of  the good?”  The writer of  the Tractatus tells us to pass it over 
in solemn silence. “But articulation, Taylor claims, “is a necessary condition 
39
of  adhesion […].”  Without articulation, he argues, the good is no option. 
And articulation should be understood in its widest implications to include 
all sorts of  speech acts (speech acts include all forms of  meaningful 
communication; a wink, for example, can be considered a speech act but a 
40
blink cannot be considered so).  Thus, Taylor claims that if  we do not want 
to live a trivial and contingent life, we need to recognize horizons of  
significance. And making these horizons explicit requires a dialogical 
attitude; we cannot define ourselves nor the good without that what exceeds 
us, i.e. the other as well the Other – horizontal as well as vertical 
transcendentalism. The good is then made explicit in dialog with significant 
41
others,  which brings us to, what Wittgenstein calls, language-games. In the 
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Tractatus he tells us to pass over the good in silence, but he also notes that “[i]t 
42
is a great temptation to try to make the spirit explicit.”  He sums it up as:
“If  someone who believes in God looks round and asks 'Where 
does everything I see come from?', 'Where does all this come 
from?', he is not craving for a (causal) explanation; and his 
question gets its point from being the expression of  a certain 
craving. He is, namely, expressing an attitude to all explanations. 
43
– But how is this manifested in his life?”
And this is manifested in the existing religions and their theologies; to 
describe these manifestations in our lives, we can use Wittgenstein's 
anthropological approach to meaning.
Wittgenstein goes against the common academic practice of  reflection 
with infinite regress. He does not believe in treating research objects as atoms 
that can be isolated from a context. They can only function – and thus 
analyzed and understood – relationally and contextually. Science, 
44
Wittgenstein claims, is not about “facts; but […] turns of  speech.”  Words 
do not contain in themselves meaning, i.e. they do not have an essence. 
Meaning, on the other hand, is shown in the use of  words, therefore, we have 
to look at the social context. Wittgenstein's approach is thus this-worldly.
How to create meaning in a world where all facts are contingent? We can 
see meaning, though, not so much in certain facts, but in a dialogical attitude. 
A self  comes into existence through acting as a part of  social practices. 
Intersubjectivity comes thus logically as well as empirically prior to 
subjectivity. I can only reflect upon myself  through familiarizing myself  with 
others. I cannot explain myself  independently from interpersonal 
relationships. “Personhood arises in a network of  relationships between 
concretely configurated acting individuals. The emergence of  the 'I am' 
45
springs from the social 'We can'.”
The other is my mirror as well as I am a mirror for the other. The self  
cannot reflect without public meaning, symbols (language) and concepts. 
The dialogical approach is such that “I act toward the other as I assume she 
will act toward the meaning of  my act and I shape my act so that it will be 
'read' as having a particular 'significance' and so prefigure a particular 
46
interpretation and appropriate response from her.”
“The 'I',” writes Barry Sandywell, “is not a noun but a verb: indexing 
Roy Voragen: Ludwig Wittgenstein: Religion as A Form of  Life
395
47
interpretive processes shaped by exchanges with other interpretive agents.”  
We are not born with an essential identity. Shaping an identity does not mean 
we have to search for an essence deep inside of  ourselves to be brought out in 
the open. We form and perform an identity through acting and interacting 
with others and our environment, i.e. performativity. That also means that an 
identity is never fixed as long as we act and interact. So says Nietzsche: “We 
separate ourselves, the doers, from the deed […], we have taken the will to do 
this or that for a cause because the action follows upon it […]. [O]ne should 
48
take the doer back into the deed […].”  Just as ethics and aesthetics, style and 
content, theory and practice, and message and messenger are connected, so 
are doer and deed connected.
Meaning is thus not in the mind of  the Cartesian self. Meaning, on the 
other hand, is shown in its use. In the Blue Book Wittgenstein writes: “But if  
we had to name anything which is the life of  the sign, we should have to say 
that it was its use. […] The sign (the sentence) gets its significance from the 
system of  signs, from the language to which it belongs. Roughly: 
49
understanding a sentence means understanding a language.”  And in the 
Philosophical Investigations he adds: “For a large class of  cases – though not for 
all – in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the 
50
meaning of  a word is its use in the language.”  Explaining meaning is thus at 
the end self-referential and circular, and a reference to 'the mind' is no way 
out of  this vicious circle.
Meaning is not exterior but interior to use. Philosophy of  language takes 
thus an anthropological turn. The philosopher has to see how words are put 
51
to use and Wittgenstein says: “don't think, but look!”  And to look at how 
language is used is to look at particular cases instead of  generalizations, so 
there is no longer room for philosophical foundations or grounding. 
52
Wittgenstein insists “on relationality and on social context […].”  
Traditional philosophizing, on the other hand, leads to infinite regress, and, 
in the end, it leads to atomistic reduction.
Wittgenstein is critical of  philosophers who are in the need of  a 
metalanguage, i.e. a language that justifies to hold 'X' over 'Y' as valid, true, 
53
beautiful, right or just.  Instead he looks at particular examples from 
different perspectives without viewing these examples as paradigm cases. 
54
Wittgenstein compares and notes dissimilarities.  He wants us “to look at [the 
55
word's] use and learn from that.”  So doing, we will not essentialize the word 
or look at it for significance, no matter how much we are prejudiced to do so. 
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Philosophizing is not “to find words to hit on the correct nuance,” however, 
56
“to imagine a language means to imagine a form of  life.”  This means that 
57
Wittgenstein does not focus on words,  but on the lives in which those words 
are used.
Meaning – and normativity – are not subjective (whether constructed by 
the mind or feelings), but reflexive and intersubjective. Meaning is thus 
agreement in use. David Boor writes:
“Normative standards come from the consensus generated by a 
number of  interacting rule followers, and it is maintained by 
collectively monitoring, controlling and sanctioning their 
individual tendencies. Consensus makes norms objective, that is, 
a source of  external and impersonal constraint on the individual. 
It gives substance to the distinction between rule followers 
thinking they have got it right, and their having really got it right. 
58
(17)”
The meaning of  a word is unfixed, because a word attains meaning as 
part of  an activity. There are a multiplicity of  uses and thus of  meanings. 
Language is fluid and its use is diversified. Wittgenstein uses the metaphor 
59
'language-game' to explain this.  A language-game is part of  a form of  life. 
And there is no possibility to give a final definition of  a language-game; 
therefore, we cannot define “what is common to all these activities and what 
60
makes them into language or part of  language.”
A language-game depends on the constituting and regulating rules of  
that game. These rules can be understood as conventions. David Boor 
concludes that 
“(1) a rule is a social institution, (2) following a rule is 
participating in a social institution, and (3) an institution can 
usefully be analyzed in terms of  collective processes having a 
self-referring or performative character. The […] facts of  
meaning are the facts of  institutional membership. Meaning is a 
61
social phenomenon.”  
We need judgement to perform rules, because rules are open-ended. 
Institutional rules can be indeterminate, they might not be clear or in 
conflict. Rules, therefore, need interpretation. This becomes even more 
apparent when we realize that we all play several roles, i.e. we participate in 
several language-games, and so we need to make priorities.
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Interpretation does not create meaning and when interpretation is 
required it cannot mean that anything goes, i.e. an infinite regression. 
Interpretation also follows rules, i.e. finitism, otherwise an interpretation 
62
regresses infinitely to other interpretations.  Compare this again with 
Aristotle's claim that a book of  rules cannot include everything. Learning 
how one should act means that one looks at those significant others who 
succeed in this: the women and men who already possess phronesis already 
know how to perform meaning.
Religion in general can be considered a form of  life and particular 
religions can then be considered language-games with a family resemblance 
among them. There is, of  course, a stronger family resemblance among 
Christian factions or Islamic ones. To make this explicit it is helpful to look at 
how the postmodernist Jean-François Lyotard and the pragmatist Richard 
Rorty put the concept 'language-game' to use.
Jean-François Lyotard defines in his book The Postmodern Condition, A 
Report on Knowledge postmodernism as the end of  all metanarratives or grand 
narratives. Instead of  metanarratives, Lyotard proposes small narratives with 
a local determinism. These localized narratives are connected to what 
Ludwig Wittgenstein calls 'language-games'. And there is a multiplicity of  
language-games with their own rules without an overarching rule-system. 
Lyotard makes “three observations about language games. The first is that 
their rules do not carry within themselves their own legitimation, but are the 
object of  a contract, explicit or not, between players […]. The second is that 
if  there are no rules, there is no game […]. The third remark [… is that] every 
63
utterance should be thought of  as a 'move' in a game.”  And every utterance 
is a part in a power struggle and “the observable social bond is composed of  
64
language 'moves'.”  Asking what the social bond constitutes is already 
participating in a language game. And a language-game can be altered – even 
if  it is institutionalized – by making unexpected 'moves', i.e. renegotiation. 
You are excluded – ostracized – from a language game if  you do not accept 
its rules. For Lyotard, the small narrative is the remaining form, 
65
metaconsensus, therefore, should be considered as outmoded and suspect.
Rorty calls French thinkers like Lyotard 'masters of  suspicion'. 
According to Rorty, we should not treat the different life-worlds as perfectly 
autonomous. Rorty tells us not to worry too much about the (lack of) 
common ground between the different life-worlds. “What is needed is a sort 
of  intellectual analogue of  civic virtue – tolerance, irony, and a willingness to 
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let spheres of  culture flourish without worrying too much about their 
'common ground', their unification, the 'intrinsic ideals' they suggest, or what 
66
picture of  man they 'presuppose'.”  Escaping from institutions, as Lyotard 
wants for fear of  oppression, is, according to Rorty, not necessarily good, 
because it does not value consensus and communication. There is a clear 
contradiction when Lyotard claims that metaconsensus is outdated and 
suspect and still considering justice as a value. Justice without consensus is a 
utopia. While there is no metajustification possible of  'we', we still need a 
67
sense of  'us', of  'community' to make justice real.  All our justifications are 
circular, because they are conducted in a final vocabulary of  a contingent 
68
'language game'. At the end, “[w]e have to start from where we are […].”  
Along history, our capability to use language grows because we keep on 
inventing new metaphors. Rorty thus looks at usefulness. “A metaphor is, so 
to speak, a voice from outside logical space, rather than filling-up of  a 
portion of  that space, or a logical-philosophical clarification of  the structure 
of  that space. It is a call to change one's language and one's life, rather than a 
69
proposal about how to systemize either.”
Beside that Rorty is more pragmatic concerning metajustifications, he 
disagrees with Lyotard that language-games are strictly compartmentalized. 
Some examples help to explain when what use makes sense.
The main character in Yann Martel's novel Life of  Pi, Piscine 'Pi' Molitor 
Patel, becomes a follower of  Hinduism, Christianity and Islam. Pi says: 
“Bapu Gandhi said, 'All religions are true.' I just want to love God […]. If  
70
there's only one nation in the sky, shouldn't all passports be valid for it?”  
This enrages followers of  the respective religions. And they are right to be 
enraged. While the different religions have a family resemblance among 
them, there are substantial differences. A perspective shapes our outlook on 
the world in fundamental ways. While all religions profess a love for God, 
meaning of  a religion is in its details for believers.
Rorty's liberal irony is unlikely to solve this conflict. Perhaps a more 
current issue is the ongoing debate between believers and (secular) scientists. 
The evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins claims that faith gives a false 
sense of  certainty. After 9/11 he goes a step further, not only is faith an 
illusion it is also dangerous:
“Revealed faith is not harmless nonsense, it can be lethally 
dangerous nonsense. Dangerous because it gives people 
unshakeable confidence in their own righteousness. Dangerous 
because it gives them false courage to kill themselves, which 
Roy Voragen: Ludwig Wittgenstein: Religion as A Form of  Life
399
automatically removes normal barriers to killing others. 
Dangerous because it teaches enmity to others labeled only by a 
difference of  inherited tradition. And dangerous because we 
have all bought into into a weird respect, which uniquely protects 
71
religion from normal criticism.”
What Dawkins forgets is that, for example, 'truth' has a different use and thus 
a different meaning in the language-game religion and the language-game 
science. These are separate language-games responding to different 
questions and needs. 
However, a scientist can very well be religious; Rorty is right that 
language-games are not strictly compartmentalized. Science has nothing to 
say about how existence came into existence. Moreover, modern science 
does not necessarily demystify the world. And terms from one language-
game can be used as a metaphor in another language-game.
By seeing an individual person merely through the perspective of  a single 
language-game – community, culture, religion or civilization – is to reduce 
that person to a single dimension. We participate in many different language-
games. Well before civilizations can clash, we have already limited the scope 
to a single perspective. Then we fall in the trap of  stereotypes – sometimes 
with good intention. That all Muslims are (potential) terrorists is as much 
nonsense as claiming that all Muslims are by definition peace lovers. Amartya 
Sen says that we have “to distinguish between (1) the various affiliations and 
loyalties a person who happens to be a Muslim has, and (2) his or her Islamic 
72
identity in particular.”  We will miss subtle differences if  we only focus on 
the second. Moreover, from an anthropological perspective it is important to 
remember that religions are born from particular cultural needs. And even 
when religions claim to be universally valid, when they travel around the 
globe they will adapt to new contexts (anthropologists call this 
acculturation).
Wittgenstein writes in the closing pages of  the Philosophical Investigations 
that “[i]f  a lion could talk, we could not understand him.”73 A lion simply 
leads a different form of  life. Just as meaning and interpretations are finite, so 
must difference be finite. When Wittgenstein refers to form of  life, he is 
actually referring to the human form of  life. This leaves room for a weak 
form of  universalism. It is human to express meaning through the use of  
language, even if  this transcends propositional language. So while actual 
74
expressions are contingent, expressing meaning is a human necessity.
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